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Abstract 
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circumstances of emerging markets? 
Seminar date    2014-05-26 
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(15 ECTS). 
Authors    David Buschermöhle and Tobias Cromme 
Advisor    Jens Forssbaeck 
Five key words The Merton model, emerging markets, ratings, emerging 
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Purpose The purpose was to investigate whether the Merton 
Model works in emerging markets and if it does how 
efficient it works there compared to in mature markets. 
Methodology The calculated default probability of the Merton model 
and the ratings were run in a regression. 
Theoretical perspective The Merton Model by Robert C. Merton (1974) which is 
based upon work by Black and Scholes (1973) 
Empirical foundation Data of 100 non-financial firms was collected, 50 
companies of mature countries and 50 of emerging 
countries. 
Conclusion Findings show that the Merton model works in emerging 
markets and considers country specific information, yet 
only through stock prices and volatility. However, the 
model does not account for quality and availability of 
information in these countries which in turn have a 
negative impact on market efficiency.  
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1 Introduction 
This Chapter will introduce the reader to the topic of the thesis; it will provide an 
understanding of the ideas and intention behind the project. Therefore, the previous research 
in the area of this topic will be discussed; furthermore, the research objective, the problem 
statement and the limitations to this study will be presented.  
 
1.1 Background to the study 
"There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. 
There's the United States and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. 
The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody's 
can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not 
clear sometimes who's more powerful" 
Thomas Friedman (Langohr & Langohr, 2010) 
Credit ratings first were applied to securities markets in the U.S. dating back to the 19
th
 
century as a consequence of an increasing distance between debtors and creditors but were 
later expanded to Europe and also included corporations. The need for further transparency, as 
well as new laws and regulations led to a wider incorporation of credit ratings in the financial 
markets resulting in recognition of rating agencies as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSROs) by the U.S. Congress in 2006 ((SEC), 2014).  
Nowadays, credit ratings and agencies have a substantial importance for the economy as they 
provide important insights into the creditworthiness of countries and corporations for 
investors and creditors. The expertise of rating agencies is needed as participants in the 
market often lack skill and time to perform a fundamental credit analysis. Additionally, credit 
ratings are an integral part of financial transactions and structuring as well as for capital 
requirements of corporations through warranting the creditworthiness of securities, 
corporations, and countries.  
Therefore, companies like Moody’s and S&P also have a duty to society, since misevaluated 
companies can cause corporate scandals such as Ahold in Europe and Enron in the US, which 
had a significant impact on the economy as a whole. Because of these recent examples of 
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corporate scandals and the impact of credit ratings provided by rating agencies the role of 
respective agencies in issuing ratings to corporations has been criticized.  
In light of the subprime mortgage crisis doubts about the integrity of the “big three” (Standard 
& Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) and the ratings they provide have risen as they cannot be held 
accountable for the accuracy of their assessment of creditworthiness. When attempting to 
remove this insulation of liability rating agencies refused to accept and argued with the 
principle of freedom of speech and claimed that they would merely express an opinion very 
much like in an editorial review. This is seen as controversial as many institutions like banks 
or pension funds are bound by law to invest in “investment grade” securities (Cane, Shamir, 
& Jodar, 2011). Furthermore, the argument of researchers that credit ratings will have an even 
more substantial impact on capital markets with regard to Basel II and Basel III should be 
considered carefully (Hwang, Chung, Siao, & Lin, 2012).  
As credit ratings gain further importance in mature markets after the adoption of Basel II and 
III it is reasonable to assume that this importance also extends to emerging market countries 
because of their rapid development to assimilate with mature markets. Especially, since 
emerging markets impose an additional uncertainty for foreign investors. Moreover, mature 
markets are mostly saturated nowadays in terms of investment opportunities leading to an 
amplified capital attraction by emerging markets.  
Presuming that mature markets are more efficient than emerging markets it is interesting to 
establish a link between the accuracy of the assigned credit ratings relative to the Merton 
model and country specific risk factors for emerging market countries such as governance and 
corruption indices. The accuracy of the Merton model relates to the completeness of market 
information as it uses public information comprised by stock and balance sheet data. Findings 
of the Merton model being accurate would therefore suggest that the same information used to 
determining a credit rating is also publicly available in market data. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the Merton model is more accurate in developed economies as their stock 
markets process information more efficient. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that countries 
with deficits in investors’ property protection have increased synchronous stock price 
movements driven by a big general impact of politically shifts and trading noise. Therefore 
these stock markets are less efficient in processing information. On the contrary, developed 
economies’ stock markets with high standards for property rights for example, exhibit more 
firm specific fluctuations in stock returns.     
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1.2 Previous research 
Previous research on the Merton model and other structural models arrived at different 
conclusions about the adequacy of the Merton model for determining default. Stein (2002) 
concludes that the model can easily be improved whereas Bohn, Arora, & Korablev (2005) 
conclude that the Merton model is adequate in capturing all information relevant for 
traditional credit ratings. Other studies focus on the functioning of the model in specific 
circumstances like in India or conclude that the Merton mode is not significant as a statistic 
for default in general (S. Bharath & Shumway, 2004).  
Furthermore, research has been done on the efficiency of stock markets in emerging and 
developed countries as well as for information asymmetry between market data and credit 
ratings. Findings show that publicly available market data can be used to predict credit events 
between 90 to 60 days prior to a credit event (Norden & Weber, 2004). In terms of comparing 
emerging with mature markets Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010) show that a potential 
information bias exists, since an analysis of stock market efficiency through trading strategies 
does not account for different frequencies of publishing information as well as the general 
availability of information.  
 
1.3 Problem statement 
Previous research applies the Merton model in emerging markets but they rarely compare it to 
ratings derived from rating agencies. Another limitation of further studies is that they apply 
the model in most of the cases in only one market, which could also explain the different 
results of the various studies. Therefore this study will fill this gap and give valuable results 
about the impact of the Merton Model on company credit ratings in emerging and developed 
countries. Due to the nature of the model, which relies on market data it will also shed light 
on the completeness of information in emerging and mature markets’ stock markets. For the 
purpose of this research it is assumed that both emerging and mature countries have efficient 
markets based on the definition given later in chapter 2.2.   
H1: Distance to default has a significant influence on credit ratings in emerging markets. 
This research revolves around the two central questions of whether country specific credit 
risks are already included in market information and therefore also in the distance to default 
derived from the Merton model, in comparison to credit ratings.  
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The ratings provided by agencies are based, among other criteria, on distance-to-default 
derived from the Merton model or models that are based on that approach. The other 
foundation of the rating is based on a qualitative analysis. This research aims to determining 
the relation between a credit rating and the distance to default computed in the Merton model. 
Because of the mentioned characteristics of mature markets, the relationship between credit 
rating and the Merton model might be stronger in mature markets compared to emerging 
markets. Consequently, the relationship between regulatory quality and corporate ratings 
should be stronger in emerging markets as it becomes of greater importance here. Therefore, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption, taken from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of the World Bank Group D. K. Kaufmann, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo (2013), will 
be examined in terms of their relevance for credit ratings in developed and emerging 
countries.  
H2: Regulatory quality and control of corruption have a significant influence on credit 
ratings in emerging markets. 
H3: Regulatory quality and control of corruption have a greater impact on credit ratings in 
emerging markets. 
The established differences between emerging markets and mature markets, as well as credit 
rating and Merton distance to default, explain the qualitative adjustments made in credit rating 
methodologies to account for country and industry specific risks. Based on the literature 
review the fundamental assumption is that mature stock markets are more effective in 
processing market information whereas emerging markets are less effective in doing so.  
H4: Distance to default has a greater impact on credit ratings in mature than in emerging 
markets. 
 
1.4 Research objective 
For the purpose of comparing the two types of markets with each other the ratings and default 
probabilities of five mature markets will be matched against each other in comparison to 
ratings and default probabilities in five emerging markets.  The Merton model incorporates 
only market and company data, which is provided by the stock markets and S&P CapitalIQ. 
This means that capital markets will be indirectly tested how well they account for the country 
specific risks of the environment they are operating in. 
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Because of information asymmetry and other efficiency issues the Merton model should work 
more accurately in mature than in emerging markets, by applying the model in these two 
different markets and further analysing in total 10 different countries with 10 different 
companies each, it is intended to mitigate any country specific biases as much as possible. 
This study contributes to previous research through setting distance to default into context 
with credit ratings with regard to information included into publicly available market data. To 
a big extend this was previously done in the context of trading strategies and stock returns 
whereas the relationship between the Merton model using public company data and company 
credit ratings will be analysed in this paper. 
1.5 Limitations to the study 
This subchapter presents the limitations of this thesis, which can be grouped according to 
limitations in the data sample and limitations in the methodology.  
A geographical limitation can be seen in the sample data since mature countries are entirely 
represented by European countries. Still, the United Kingdom is represented and therefore the 
Anglo-Saxon region finds consideration although there are no U.S. companies included. 
Furthermore, only five emerging and five mature countries are represented in the sample. 
Besides the geographical limitations, the chosen period of six years (2007-2012) can contain 
inherent biases considering the financial crisis from 2007 to 2008. However, there is no 
empirical evidence that rating agencies behaved differently during the crisis.  
Limitations in the methodology are the usage of only two governance indicators of which one 
was dropped because of high correlation is a major limitation. Using a wider selection of 
governance indicators could lead to a higher explanatory power of the regression. A major 
limitation regarding the Merton model is the use of a standard normal distribution, while the 
model applied by Moody’s (Moody’s KMV) uses a proprietary database of real-world 
distribution, mitigating the fat-tail problem (This will be further discussed in Chapter 2). 
Another limitation of the Merton model is that it does not capture risks of companies that 
carry sizeable off-balance sheet exposures; nonetheless these exposures are indirectly 
represented in the stock market data. Besides that, the simplifications applied for the Merton 
model comprise some limitations (Chapter 3.3.5). In order to compare the ratings of S&P’s 
and Moody’s with the distance to default derived from the Merton model, a numerical table 
has been assigned to the alphabetic ratings. It assumes a linear relationship between distance 
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to default and the ratings, which is not the case in reality. The impact of this is discussed in 
chapters 3.4 and 3.8.3. 
Another source of error can be seen in the way the Merton model and the rating agencies 
handle changes of environment concerning the rated company. Whereas the Merton model 
directly reflects this in a changed distance to default, the rating agencies rather put the 
relevant company “on watch” and change the rating when the new conditions seem to be 
stable. 
Finally, for the purpose of this research it has to be assumed that credit ratings are correct and 
timely adequate in capturing a firm’s creditworthiness which is a further limitation of this 
study. It can be possible that the distance to default derived from the Merton model is closest 
to reality whereas agencies failed to do so or did not in an appropriate timely fashion. Past 
scandals like Enron are proof for this possibility.  
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2 Theory  
This chapter covers the fundamental knowledge necessary to enable the reader in 
understanding the relevant theories applied in this paper. In order to ensure that the reader 
can follow the argumentation, all the relevant literature considered will be discussed. At the 
end of the chapter, the research hypothesises will be presented. 
 
2.1 Emerging markets 
Emerging markets are generally associated with rapid growth and industrialization, the 
emerging markets applied in this paper are based on the classification of the IMF. The IMF 
classifies 150 countries as emerging markets based on several selection criteria as for instance 
composition of countries, export earnings and other income from abroad.  
Although emerging markets capture interesting investment opportunities, they also inherent 
various risks associated with the investments. In effect investors have less information 
available in these markets, moreover are they characterized by less presence of intermediaries 
as for instance financial analysts (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005). Therefore, credit ratings 
might play an important role in these markets since they extend the information in these 
markets. On the other hand also rating agencies are facing the problem of information 
availability. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) identify credit ratings besides other criteria as a major 
barrier to invest in emerging markets.  
An empirical study by Kamin and Von Kleist (1999) observed that besides national factors 
creditworthiness of emerging markets is also influenced by some internationals determinants 
as for instance: Interest rates, S&P 500 returns and oil prices. An increase in the mentioned 
factors would lead to a decrease of creditworthiness in emerging markets and therefore also 
the rating. 
During former times credit ratings agencies had a policy of not rating companies above the 
sovereign rating, the so called “sovereign ceiling”. Nowadays CRA’s claim that they have 
moved away from this policy, still it seems like they still apply this policy to some extent. 
Especially looking at the big emerging market firms that generate their cash flow to a large 
extent from global operations, it does not seems appropriate to downgrade them based on a 
lower sovereign rating. On the other hand, the sovereign rating can be seen as a key factor 
since a country in default can push its corporate sector down. Borensztein, Valenzuela, and 
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Cowan (2007) call this phenomenon “sovereign ceiling lite”, since the sovereign rating is not 
an absolute constraint but can push the rating down. 
An empirical study performed by (Kräussl, 2005) found out that CRA’s have a huge influence 
on size and volatility of emerging capital markets, which highlights their critical role in these 
markets. Especially because of the aforementioned limitations of information, rating changes 
can be a sign for new information available. 
Bruce et al. (2005) summarise in their study the challenges of emerging markets, the 
challenges that apply especially for CRA are: Inadequate market data, not transparent 
regulation, government support and the lack of reliable market research firms.  
2.2 Market efficiency 
There are different ways to define the efficient functioning of a market and the efficient 
market hypothesis is probably the most prominent among them Fama (1991) which states that 
stock prices fully contain all information that is available. A weaker yet more adequate 
version of this hypothesis is that information is reflected until the benefits of acting on 
information do not exceed the costs stipulated by Jensen (1978). Fama (1991) furthermore 
arrives at the conclusion that the reaction speed of stock prices to changes in information is 
vital for efficient markets. The basis of the efficient market definition here is also based on a 
comparison between normal and abnormal stock returns.  
A similar setting was used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who tried to assess stock market 
efficiency through the trading strategy buying last week’s winners and selling its losers. This 
is the opposite approach to the contrarian strategy (short-term reversal) analysed by (Griffin et 
al., 2010). The efficiency here is defined as an investor’s inability to achieve abnormal returns 
or profits through arbitrage. Because markets are efficient it is not possible to achieve profits 
on information since it would be available to every participant in the market.  
However, Griffin et al. (2010) also talk about potential biases with regard to information. This 
indicates an ongoing discussion with regard to emerging market efficiency and a general 
convention is hard to determine which creates a good opportunity for a comparison between 
credit risk derived from pure market data and credit ratings subject to a comprehensive 
fundamental analysis conducted by a specialized organization. Furthermore, the definition of 
market efficiency is an important factor as it could be measured by information incorporation 
speed or for example analyst coverage and availability of information which would yield 
different results.  
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For the purpose of this research an efficient market is defined through a significant match 
between the independent variables (distance to default & regulatory quality) and the 
dependent variable (credit rating). The credit rating is thereby used as the benchmark of all 
available information in the market that is compared against DD and regulatory quality in the 
given country for a company.  
 
2.3 Credit risk 
In the following, credit risk will be defined based on a top-down approach proposed by S&P. 
This process clearly exhibits all relevant components of credit risk and gives a clear 
understanding of how credit risk is examined and determined. 
Ganguin and Bilardello (2005) define credit risk as a firm’s ability to meet its financial 
obligations in adequate timely fashion. This ability varies among companies, industries, and 
countries. Because of increasing volatility in debt markets and default levels, new procedures 
emerged to cope with these developments, like new statistical models and credit default swaps 
which complement the fundamental analysis of corporate credit risk. Edward Z. Emmer noted 
that this analysis is more of an art than a science as there is no generalizable recipe that 
applies to corporations (Ganguin & Bilardello, 2005).  
Credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s apply a scoring system to rank a company’s risk 
of default on their obligations specified in their contracts. In this system grades are assigned 
which vary from an imminent non-payment to virtually risk-free lending. Furthermore, 
Ganguin and Bilardello (2005) note that two types of credit risk exist, the default risk itself 
and the risk of recovering a lenders prospects which is described as default risk in terms of the 
capacity and willingness to service debt in an adequate manner and recovery prospects as an 
evaluation of loss and recovery of the investment of a lender in the event of default. 
The credit risk for businesses is defined by six elements or levels that exert influence over a 
company’s credit risk in different ways, Ganguin and Bilardello (2005) proposed the 
following top-down approach for assessment. Country and sovereign government risk 
influences credit risk in terms of established laws within a country, its physical and social 
component, financial markets, and macroeconomic factors as well as exchange rate risks. The 
physical component in this case refers to e.g. infrastructure of a country , whereas the social 
component describes the cultural background as credit policies have evolved in different ways 
over the past centuries in different cultures.  
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The industry a corporation is operating in, is another important factor to consider when 
analysing credit risk as industry patterns, cyclicality, entry barriers, and the sales and revenue 
potential differ among industries, directly affecting a firm’s ability to service its debt 
obligations. Mature industries will for example exhibit less potential for growths than newly 
emerging industries based on e-commerce.  
In terms of company specific business risk, direct competitors, a firm’s market position and 
their strategy play an important role. This basically captures how a company utilizes its assets 
to generate value in order to service their debt obligations. The stability of this value creation 
process in form of revenue stream and cash generation capability is an important factor. 
Basically, this component of credit risk can be linked to Porter’s Five Forces to analyse a 
company’s competitive position within its industry and among its peers. Other contributing 
factors are product and sales diversity to withstand shocks and add stability, the market share 
works as a co-insurance factor through the seize of a company, and asset tractability enabling 
firms to liquidate non-core assets.  
The management factor in terms of corporate credit risk plays an important role in relation to 
the governance of a company and their willingness to meet contractual debt obligations. An 
evaluation of corporate governance informs about the uprightness management, which is an 
important point to consider for lenders. A clean and transparent historical track record of 
management decisions is of course more favourable than a management team that has for 
example exhibited dishonest behavioural patterns. Furthermore, strategic and financial 
policies establish a firm’s risk profile which is a key factor for the assessment of 
creditworthiness. A company’s management team determines the usage of its assets in order 
to achieve targeted performance levels. Their success and failure in doing so sheds light on 
the quality of an organization’s management and therefore ultimately on its future 
performance as the company’s management lastly determines the success no matter how 
favourable the market’s position or assets, which come in form of, for example, intellectual 
property or organizational structure. This assessment has to be conducted over time and not 
for single occurrences to determine consistency. But one cannot forget that management 
usually is driven by shareholder expectations who have different goals and expectations 
towards a company’s performance which could make an assessment of management 
subjective from a creditor’s point of view.  
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The financial risk profile of a company lastly is directly linked to profitability, cash 
generation and the liquidity of an organization and also informs on future cash flow 
projections affecting the capability of servicing contractual debt obligations.  
2.4 Importance of credit risks for companies and countries 
For corporations and investors, credit ratings traditionally have been a tool to reduce 
investment risks, to determine the spread of debt instruments and to assess bankruptcy risks. 
In the article “Present and Future Position of Credit Rating” Dziawgo (2012) argues that with 
regard to the financial crisis of 2007 credit ratings and the respective risks were of greater 
consequence for ABS (asset-backed securitization) than for bonds. This is due to the fact that 
agencies mispriced the securities which nonetheless had the same rating letters. The 
underlying problem in this case was that investors had no alternatives when obtaining 
information about creditworthiness, whereas more objective information was available for 
bonds (Dziawgo, 2012). Furthermore, it is arguable that governments relying less and less on 
conventional credit ratings could be a warning signal for investors and organizations not to 
rely too much on the assessment of rating agencies. The article “Do Credit Ratings Matter?” 
by Ronald L. Delegge (2011) states that the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) is 
increasingly abandoning the dependence on credit ratings for eligibility requirements as a 
consequence of the crisis. For instance, the SEC is planning to regulate credit ratings tied to 
investment regulation through an “Office of Credit Ratings” in the USA as many regulations 
relied on ratings provided by private organizations. In addition, the author argues that 
although agencies employ a sovereign rating ceiling, which states that corporations cannot 
obtain funds at better conditions that their host country, companies like Exxon Mobil and 
Microsoft for example maintain a better rating than the US (DELEGGE, 2011). However, if 
employed correctly the sovereign ceiling actually has a negative effect on a firm’s ability to 
obtain funds.   
With regard to countries credit risk in the form of ratings, as already mentioned, is part of 
many investment regulations to date. Dziawgo (2012) states in his article that downgrading on 
a large scale like during the 2007 crisis can even worsen the crisis through loss of trust as it is 
common for rating agencies to be rather reluctant to frequently change credit ratings in order 
to display stability. Furthermore, Delegge (2011) argues in his article that rating agencies are 
hardly accurate and adequate in their predictions of sovereign default, since Russia and 
Argentina both held investment grade ratings before defaulting in 1998 and 2001 respectively. 
This shift in the landscape of today’s credit ratings leads to questioning the relevance of 
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traditional credit risk assessment. However, the information of creditworthiness has become 
increasingly more important. (Dziawgo, 2012).  
2.5 Moody’s & S&P’s credit rating methodology 
Rating agencies are private, profit oriented institutions that determine the credit risk for 
companies of all sectors as well as that of governments. The results of their investigation are 
presented in credit ratings and a credit rating scale usually goes from AAA (best) to D 
(default). 
The recent financial crisis has not only increased the knowledge on rating agencies, it has also 
shown their critical role in investment decisions. Although credit rating agencies are subject 
of governmental supervision, the regulatory use of credit ratings has given (quasi) – 
regulatory authority to credit rating agencies. National regulatory authorities have made use of 
rating agencies in order to increase the risk sensitivity of investment restrictions. This trend is 
however reverting as regulatory authorities began to strive for a reduction of the dependency 
on credit rating agencies after the crisis of 2007 (Delegge, 2011). On an international level, 
the Basel II act provided for the use of credit ratings from approved rating agencies. This has 
increased their role in the financial system. Through so-called “sovereign ratings” credit 
rating agencies might even be in a position to influence economic and financial policies of 
states (Scott, 2002).  
Rating agencies also often employ a sovereign rating ceiling to corporate ratings. This means 
that companies residing in a country cannot get a higher rating than its host country, as a firm 
is not able to borrow at better conditions than the government in theory. Borensztein et al. 
(2007) however find that, although agencies tend to move away from this rule, sovereign 
ratings still have an important role in corporate credit ratings. This may have an impact on the 
findings of this study as findings could be distorted through the application of this rule, which 
has an increased importance for corporate ratings in emerging markets (Borensztein et al., 
2007). Additionally, the authors propose a reconsideration of this rule as sovereign defaults 
not always affect private defaults and if so there is not necessarily a causal connection 
between the two events. The argument is that this rule imposes a possibly extensive, 
unnecessary penalty on the private sector.  
Moody’s states that ratings involve many unique factors with regard to country, industry, and 
company. Therefore, a generalized approach would not capture a company’s credit risk 
factors in an adequate manner. In order to address this problems Moody’s for example utilizes 
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a multidisciplinary approach to risk analysis (Moody's, 2014). Based on the relevant industry 
key factors are chosen for the methodology which also consist of sub factors. At the example 
of the methodology for the oil and gas industry, Moody’s includes sub factors for average 
daily production, proved reserves, and total crude distillation capacity for the main factor 
scale. A similar approach is applied by Standard & Poor’s (S&P, 2014).  
 
There are different types of ratings that can be distinguished, most important are: 
Table 1. Different ratings of Moody's 
Type of rating Description 
Issuer rating Creditworthiness of public & private 
borrowers 
Issue rating Rating of specific financial products, bonds, 
loans & CDO’s 
Long-term rating Rating for a time horizon greater than one 
year 
Short-term rating Rating for a time horizon smaller than one 
year 
Confidential rating Most of the ratings are published and freely 
available 
Published rating 
Solicited ratings Requested by and prepared in consultation 
with the issuer of the rated financial product 
Unsolicited ratings Less common case, a rating agency 
produces a rating on its own (unpaid) 
unsolicited ratings tend to be lower since 
they are solely based on publicly available 
information 
 
 
There are a lot of theories that focus on potential biases in the relationship between credit 
agencies and their clients in solicited ratings (Covitz & Harrison, 2003). However due to the 
limited time available for this paper, this will not be discussed further. In general, credit rating 
agencies base their analysis of corporate credit risk on a company’s financial statement, 
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franchise value, management quality and competitive position in the industry. The basic 
function of credit rating agencies in financial markets is, to lower transaction costs and to 
reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders in financial markets 
(Overbeek, Van Apeldoorn, & Nölke, 2007). Credit rating agencies act as intermediaries 
between capital supply and demand. Their ratings as discussed above are broadly categorized 
as either investment grade or speculative grade ratings. These ratings enable potential 
investors to compare different issuers and financial products. Bad ratings lead to steeply 
increasing interest rates and may even prevent actors from getting access to private capital 
(Scott, 2002). 
The number of actors within the credit rating industry has increased since the 1990’s but 
Moody’s and Standard & Poors tend to dominate the market, since they produce 80% of 
ratings issued worldwide (Scott, 2002). Therefore this study will only use data provided by 
these two rating agencies.  
2.5.1 Moody’s 
Moody’s was founded in 1909 and has it’s headquarters in New York City. The company has 
a very interesting acquisition history for the purpose of this study. In 2002 Moody’s acquired 
KMV, the leader in quantitative credit risk management tools. KMV applies the framework of 
Merton (1974) (S. T. Bharath & Shumway, 2008). It is therefore possible that this 
investigation yields similar results as Moody’s does, however Moody’s does not publish to 
what extent they apply the Merton model; therefore it is only possible to speculate about its 
influence on the final rating. 
However, there are significant differences between the KMV-Merton and the Merton model. 
The KMW model is a generalization of the Merton model that allows for various classes and 
maturities of debt. Moreover Moody’s is using its large historical database to estimate the 
empirical distribution of changes in distances to default. The KMV model may also make 
proprietary adjustments to the accounting information that is used to calculate the face value 
of debt. 
2.5.2  Standard and Poor’s 
S&P was founded in 1941 and its headquarters also located in New York City. Besides its 
rating activities, S&P also creates stock indices for instance the well-known S&P 500. There 
is no evidence which quantitative model S&P uses and to what extent they apply it. Since 
most of Moody’s and S&P’s ratings are very close to each other, it is very likely that S&P 
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applies a similar model as Moody’s, however the two might differ for instance in the ratios 
they apply to different variables (Moon & Stotsky, 1993).  
2.6 Merton model  
The Merton model is based on the Black and Scholes option pricing model and was developed 
by Robert C. Merton in 1971. The model is used to evaluate the credit risk of a company’s 
debt. Different brokerage firms, analysts and some investors employ the model in order to 
determine a company’s ability to service its debt. Moreover, the model is the fundamental 
base of well-known credit rating agencies as for instance Moody’s. 
The Merton Model’s origin as an option pricing model can be seen in the way the model 
determines its variables. The value of equity is regarded as a call option on the assets of a 
firm, whereas the value of debt is also dependent on the value of firm’s assets. Liabilities and 
equity of a firm are seen as a contingent claim. Since the value of debt is a fixed claim, its 
market value can never be greater than its face value. 
There is always a certain risk that the asset value falls below the face value of debt which 
reduces the market value of debt. The probability that this case occurs and the company 
defaults is called the credit risk.  
Figure 1. Visualisation of the Merton model 
 
The y-axis measures the asset value, whereas the x-axis measures time. The blue line 
represents the default barrier and is driven by principle and interests due within the time T. 
The asset value itself is represented in the red line and consists of the market value of equity, 
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debt and its expected growth. The assets grow by asset return and since the asset value 
represents the total company value, the Merton Model assumes a company to grow by its 
asset returns. The asset path, which is shown in green, is unknown at time T. Assuming a log 
normal distribution of the asset value, the probability of default at time T can be predicted by 
calculating the number of standard deviations between the expected asset value and default 
barrier at time T. The red area below the default barrier is the probability of default. When the 
distance between the asset value and the default barrier decreases, asset growth decreases or 
asset volatility increases, the probability of default increases. According to Gropp et al (2006). 
and as mentioned above, the distance to default (DD) is measured in terms of the standard 
deviations between the current asset value and liabilities where the event of default is marked 
by the asset value equalling the liabilities. Models using this type of approach are referred to 
as structural models as they analyse the structural relationships between asset value, debt, and 
equity value. The formula for calculating the distance to default is  
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 The value of the firm now -    
 The risk-free rate – r 
 The volatility of asset value – σ 
 The default barrier (debt) – B 
 The time horizon - T 
2.6.1 Non-structural models 
Other models using a non-structural approach like the Altman Z-score also have been 
developed in the past. Z-scores are calculated using a multivariate discriminate analysis for 
which Altman considered 22 financial inputs of which five accounting ratios were proven to 
be adequate for bankruptcy risk assessment. The formula used for calculating the Z-score for 
manufacturing firms is displayed below as an example: 
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 The working capital - WC 
 The function of liquidity measure WC/V 
 The market value of the firm - V 
 The retained earnings - RE 
 The cumulative profitability, leverage, and age indicator – RE/V 
 The earnings power indicator – EBIT/V 
 The market value of equity - ME 
 The book value of liability - BL 
 The distress barrier indicator – ME/BL 
 Sales - S 
 The asset turnover ratio – S/V 
This was later revised and complemented by several other researchers like Shumway or 
Hillegeist and applied to different situations like private companies, non-manufacturing 
companies, or emerging markets. The interpretation of the Z-score is slightly different 
than the default probabilities derived from the Merton model as the Z-score is not a 
default probability but an indicator for a company’s default in the next year. The scores 
for the manufacturing model are: 
                                     
                                 
                    
Ohlsons O-score was another statistical model that was developed in 1980 and employs a 
conditional logistic model in order to predict financial distress for companies. Whereas 
statistical models are based on large samples and examine relationships between the 
introduced relevant variables, structural models examine structural relationships on the 
balance sheets of corporations. Therefore, statistical models like the Altman Z-score are 
inadequate for this study as they are not based on present market data but large historical 
databases. Consequently they are unable account for market specific circumstances in terms 
of assessing a company’s creditworthiness. 
25 
2.7 Literature review 
Investigating the previous research, there are two important fields of research to study, first 
studies that apply the Merton Model or similar models in emerging markets and secondly 
studies that analyse the specific circumstances of emerging markets and their influences on 
the national stock market. First, general literature on the Merton model that is relevant to this 
paper will be presented. Then, the model will be set into context with market efficiency and 
finally implications of previous research on sovereign ratings for this study will be shown.   
There have been several studies about the contribution of the Merton model, not all of them 
arriving at the same conclusion. The first ones that analysed the model were experts employed 
by KMV or Merton. Whereas Stein (2002) came to the conclusion that the Merton model can 
be easily improved, Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005) believe that the model captures all 
information in traditional agency ratings. For both perspectives reasonable arguments can be 
found.  
Kulkarni, Mishra, and Thakker (2005) compared the distance to defaults derived from Robert 
C. Merton’s model to credit ratings in India and came to the conclusion that the model is able 
to differentiate top-rated firms from those in default. Another valuable finding is that the 
model depends significantly on equity volatility. On the other hand S. Bharath and Shumway 
(2004) find that the model is not a significant statistic for default. It is however difficult to 
compare the results of these two studies, since the first only differentiates between top ratings 
and default and the second analyses its ability to forecast default in general.  
In their study Duyvesteyn and Martens (2012) apply the Merton Model in thirteen emerging 
countries, four of the five countries used in this study are represented also in theirs. They 
intend to forecast sovereign default risk with the Merton Model, therefore they use the 
approach by Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007), which adapts the Merton Model in order to 
work with sovereign balance sheets. The model outcomes (distance to default, default 
probability and spreads) are strongly correlated with the market CDS spreads. They further 
discover that the exchange rate volatility has a huge impact, which is equivalent to the equity 
volatility in the corporate version of the Merton model. Therefore, it supports the previously 
mentioned findings (Kulkarni, Mishra, & Thakker, 2005). 
Chen, Chou, Wang, and Zaabar (2011) apply the Merton Model in comparison to Duan 
(2000) transformed-data maximum likelihood estimation. Duan’s model estimates the 
unobservable parameters necessary to apply the Merton Model, for instance it claims that 
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default barrier is 30% of the firm’s assets. They base their research on a study of Tudela and 
Young (2003) that states that companies can default before the maturity of debt, therefore 
they release the default point setting. Further Crosbie and Bohn (2003) argue that some 
companies are still in business even though asset values are below debt values, these 
companies were first regarded as default when assets were far below value of debt. Hence 
each company has a unique default barrier. For the purpose of their research Chen, Chou, 
Wang, & Zaabar  (2011) collected data of 1406 firms in Taiwan for the period of 2002-2006. 
When comparing the Barrier Option Model to the Merton model, they obtained empirical 
evidence that both models have better predictive power on the Taiwan stock exchange than 
for Taiwan’s over-the-counter market. This observation is explained by there being less 
information available in the over-the-counter market. 
So far, the literature implies that there is no clear consensus yet with regard to the Merton 
model’s ability to forecast default. The different results can essentially be explained by the 
different research settings and comparisons that were applied.  
Griffin et al. examine the correctness of market efficiency measures in a comparison between 
developed and emerging market countries. They find that trading strategies like the “short-
term reversal strategy” show similar returns in emerging and developed markets before 
transaction costs. However, emerging markets exhibit much higher transaction costs which 
diminish the returns of a trading strategy. They argue that efficiency in these terms is derived 
from transaction costs and information production and find that emerging markets are less 
efficient in this regard. But the incorporation of information also causes biases as firms with 
less published news appear to be more efficient in incorporating information than those, for 
example, that publish information daily. For emerging markets it has been found that there is 
a general lower analyst coverage and less available public information on corporations which 
can make emerging market firms appear more efficient (Griffin et al., 2010).  
When comparing market efficiency to the efficiency or completeness of credit ratings with 
regard to information, Norden and Weber (2004) find that both CDS and stock markets react 
between 90 and 60 days prior to a downgrade. This leads to the conclusion that markets and 
rating agencies have access to equal information. The sample of this study consists of 
companies listed on major stock indices as for instance the S&P 500 across emerging and 
developed countries. These findings are prerequisite for this study as they suggest that the 
information necessary for predict credit events by S&P and Moody’s are already included in 
publicly available market data. A failure of the Merton model to capture credit relevant 
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information would therefore be related to deficiencies of the model itself and not the publicly 
available information in the market.   
Henisz and Zelner (2010) discuss country risks in emerging markets from a foreign investor’s 
perspective. They claim that the risks in emerging markets have changed where governments 
in former times took a rather direct and drastic approach to gain value from foreign investors, 
they now take a rather sustainable and indirect one. The former approach of downsizing a 
firm’s assets has nearly disappeared, whereas nowadays emerging countries have learned that 
they can gain much more money through regulatory contracts. A study done by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers finds, that an opaque policy-making environment is equivalent to at 
least 33% in taxation. Furthermore the paper questions the efficiency of ratings, since they 
claim them to be only backwards looking but they state that an analyst needs to be looking 
backwards and forwards. Moreover they say that ratings fail to acknowledge that levels of risk 
policies vary among investors in a country.  
Concluding the research with regard to market efficiency, it suggests that the Merton model 
works better in efficient markets. However, Griffin et al. (2010) show that biases with respect 
to efficiency exist and also the efficiency of credit ratings is questioned. The impact of market 
efficiency on the Merton model implies that a comparison of the Merton model and credit 
ratings can shed light on the information content of the analyzed markets, as the model will be 
more accurate in determining credit ratings in efficient markets.   
An important aspect of a rating is the corporate governance system, since it deals with the 
level of investor’s protection. Borensztein et al. (2007) analysed in their paper 321 firms in 25 
emerging countries, only two of these 321 firms have an above average rating, 319 were 
below average.  
However, an investigation by  in which he analysed the efficiency of corporate governance 
systems in emerging markets based on CEO turnover, exemplified, that poorly performing 
CEO’s are more likely to lose their jobs. This can be seen as one indicator for corporate 
governance systems being efficient. Nevertheless, CEO’s of firms with large domestic 
shareholders are not more likely to lose their jobs when performing badly, which can be seen 
as an indication for low minority shareholders protection.  
In most of the cases, the rating of the country the company is operating in has another 
significant impact on a company’s rating. R. Brooks, Faff, Hillier, and Hillier (2004) 
discussed in their paper the impact of sovereign rating changes on the stock market. They 
found evidence that downgrades have an impact on the markets returns in two different ways. 
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First of all the domestic stock market is affected; secondly the dollar value of the country’s 
currency depreciates. An interesting outcome was that of the four rating agencies examined 
only S&P and Fitch rating downgrades resulted in significant market falls. 
Since the sovereign credit ratings are assumed to have a huge impact on the corporate ratings, 
it is very surprising to see that there are various differences between the sovereign ratings of 
the different rating agencies.Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) analyze the causes and extent of 
split sovereign ratings. They did this over a period of nine years, from 2000-2008, by using a 
20-point numerical scale in order to compare the ratings of the different agencies. 
Surprisingly, they found a high frequency of disagreement across agencies on emerging 
sovereign ratings. Whereas S&P and Fitch have the lowest frequency of disagreement, 
Moodys & S&P have the highest frequency with 59,4%. However most of the rating 
differences are small only a few are big. The differences can be explained by the 
consideration of different macroeconomic factors of each of the rating agencies and the use of 
different weights for the factors. The study further proved the bias home hypothesis, which 
claims that national agencies tend to come up with different ratings than foreign agencies. 
It might seem as if studies around corporate governance are not directly associated with this 
topic in the first place - however all of these studies deal with the impact of the emerging 
markets environment on ratings or with a specific variable as for instance sovereign ratings. 
Especially the paper of Alsakka and and Gwilym provided valuable input, since it  validates 
the choice of a foreign rating agency in order to avoid bias home hypothesis. Moreover, the 
articles above help to provide a general understanding of the specific frauds in an emerging 
market.  
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2.8 Research hypotheses 
Figure 2 summarises the research hypotheses outlined in chapter 1.3. 
Figure 2. Graphic visualization of the research hypotheses 
 
Distance to 
default  
H1: Distance to default has 
a significant influence on 
credit ratings in emerging 
markets. 
H4: Distance to default has 
a greater impact on credit 
ratings in mature than in 
emerging markets. 
Regulatory 
quality 
H2: Regulatory quality and 
control of corruption have a 
significant influence on 
credit ratings in emerging 
markets. 
H3: Regulatory quality and 
control of corruption have a 
greater impact on credit 
ratings in emerging 
markets. 
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3 Methodology 
Within this chapter, the methodology applied is presented. The given information should 
enable the reader to follow and replicate our method. In the beginning of the chapter, the 
sample of companies studied will be discussed, afterwards, the different Merton model 
variables will be shown, followed by the regression analysis. At the end a graphical summary 
of the methodology is presented. 
3.1 Sample 
The set of emerging market countries is chosen according to a list published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the end of 2012 (IMF, 2012). As the timeframe of the 
research is 2007 to 2012 the economy should at least be declared as emerging or developing 
until the end of that year. Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia and Mexico were chosen due to 
their growing economies and sufficient number of public companies. Other than that there 
were no particular selection criteria in place for emerging market countries. The developed 
nations were chosen with the same criterion of relatively big economies. For the sample only 
European firms were chosen in order to maintain consistency within the sample, as there are 
some substantial differences between the European and the U.S. economy.  
For each country a stock index is chosen in order to select the companies: France CAC 40, 
Germany DAX, Netherlands AEX, Sweden OMXS 30, United Kingdom FTSE 100, 
Argentina MERVAL, Brazil Bovespa, India BSE Sensex, Indonesia IDX Composite, and 
Mexico IPC. All companies were first taken into an alphabetic order and afterwards selected 
randomly from the relevant stock index. Only non-financial firms are taken into 
considerations, since financial organizations differ in the structure of their balance sheet and 
hence the way they are rated. A complete list of the companies can be found in the appendix. 
The data is collected with S&P’s software Capital IQ within the period of 2007-2012. 
Additional data needed such as stock prices are taken from Yahoo finance Yahoo! (2014), the 
ratings are taken from the websites of Moody’s and S&P’s. 
The selection criteria for firms were first of all the availability of the data itself. For the period 
of 2007 until 2012 the chosen organization were required to have available daily stock data, 
annual balance sheet publications, and credit ratings.  Industries or company size in terms of 
market capitalization is not specified in order to generate more generalizable results. In 
addition, the companies will not be compared against each other but only internally through 
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different distances to default derived from the Merton model and credit ratings. Therefore the 
particular size or industry does not have an impact on the accuracy of Merton distance to 
default relative to credit ratings.  
In total a random sample of 100 firms, 50 from mature and 50 from emerging countries was 
collected. In order to avoid country specific biases and with respect to the limited time 
available for the project, the research is limited to the aforementioned five emerging and five 
mature countries. However, for some years the ratings were withdrawn, therefore these years 
are dropped from the sample which is more frequently the case for emerging than mature 
companies. In order to balance dropped ratings, 20% more companies (two companies) for 
each country are collected. In some cases this buffer was however not sufficient, therefore 
countries with both more and less than 10 companies and with less than ten companies are 
represented in the sample. 
Table 2. Number of companies in each county, in emerging and mature countries 
Mature countries Num. of company’s Emerging countries Num. of company’s 
France 10 Argentina 7 
Germany 12 Brazil 10 
Netherlands 12 India 10 
Sweden 11 Indonesia 5 
United Kingdom 10 Mexico 7 
 
The collected data is separated between mature and emerging markets and divided among 10 
different industries, as presented in Graph 3.1 and 3.2. This helps to get a further 
understanding of the data and hence locate potential sources of biases. Comparing both 
graphs, a rather strong focus on oil & gas and energy companies in emerging markets in 
contrast to mature markets can be detected, whereas mature market companies are rather 
strong in industrial goods. It seems natural to assume that gas & oil companies have higher 
ratings as a result of their stable income and high profits. Since larger or smaller gaps between 
distance to default and the ratings among different industries are not expected, this should not 
have any negative influence on the results. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of mature market companies among 10 industries 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of emerging market companies among 10 industries 
 
Although the sample is randomized, in each market a tendency towards certain industry 
attributes can be seen. Whereas mature markets have a strong focus on industrial goods and 
services, emerging markets exhibit an equal focus on services, energy and oil & gas. One 
explanation for this can be, that oil & gas , industrial goods, and energy companies highly 
benefit from scaled operations. Therefore they are naturally larger and more frequently 
represented in stock market indices with an increased chance of having rated debt. 
Consequently they meet the data requirements more easily and appear more often in the 
sample data.  
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3.2 Moody’s and S&P’s ratings 
Moody’s and S&P’s ratings are only used for comparisons. Past studies found that local rating 
agencies tend to get different results from foreign rating agencies, therefore only foreign 
rating agencies were chosen in order to mitigate potential biases (Ferri, Lacitignola, & Lee, 
2013). 
3.3 Merton model variables 
3.3.1 Distress barrier 
The distress barrier is calculated as the sum of short-term debt, current portion of long-term 
debt and half the amount of long-term debt on a company’s balance sheet. By incorporating 
the current portion of long-term debt and half the amount of long-term debt into the distress 
barrier, it is intended to account for the principle and interest payments (P&I) due within the 
fiscal year.  
Later versions of the Merton Model can already incorporate interest rates in various ways, 
however this is a very complex and time-consuming process. Due to the limited time available 
and for reasons of simplification, the above mentioned assumption is made, which is also 
suggested by Gray & Malone (2008). 
Calculating the distress barrier in the way discussed above overestimates the principle and 
interest payments, nevertheless it brings the model and hence the calculated result closer to 
reality. It is further an advanced approach compared to the original version of the Merton 
model which implies only short-term debt. Moreover, empirical data from KMV did find that 
firms usually had gone into default between long & short-term debt (Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 
2000). Not including long-term debt would therefore underestimate the default-barrier. 
All required data is collected with S&P’s Capital IQ, since yearly balance sheets are used the 
debt is assumed to be stable during the year. 
3.3.2  Market value of assets 
Since the Merton model is a contingent claims model it only requires collecting data for the 
market value of equity, which is fairly easy observable for listed companies. The market value 
of a company’s assets is assumed to be equal to the market value of equity plus the face value 
of total debt. The required market value of equity is equal to market capitalization, which is 
calculated as shares outstanding multiplied by the share price. 
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First of all, the daily stock prices are collected for each company from Yahoo! finance; then a 
yearly average stock price is calculated and multiplied by the average shares outstanding 
during the fiscal year in order to determine the market capitalization. The time horizon for the 
study is 2007-2012. 
 
3.3.3  Predicted asset growth 
According to Gray & Malone (2008) there are two probabilities of default, the “actual” 
probability with expected asset return( µ) and the “risk-adjusted” or “risk-neutral” probability 
calculated with the risk-free rate as expected asset return. They differ in terms of the 
distribution of assets in relation to the default barrier being greater than assets growing at the 
risk-free rate since market prices for risk in reality are greater than zero. For the scope of this 
paper and because the Merton model is built under the assumption of a risk-free environment, 
the risk-free rate is used  as proxy for predicted asset growth derived from one year 
government bonds as it is not the purpose of this investigation to find more practical 
alternatives for asset growth.  
3.3.4  Volatility of asset growth 
As the volatility of asset growth is an unobservable variable, it is derived from the formula: 
  
 
 
       
 
 
( 3 ) 
To solve this equation for the volatility of asset growth, it is necessary to calculate market 
value of assets and equity, as well as equity volatility. For the market value of assets the 
simplification of adding the default barrier (B) is applied, computed as discussed below, to 
equity market capitalization (E). The market value of equity is derived from an annual 
average stock price and the total shares outstanding on the balance sheet date. Annual stock 
price is computed from the mean of daily observations in the given year. Empirical evidence 
for the application of this simplification can be found in various study’s (Afik, Arad, & Galil, 
2012; S. T. Bharath & Shumway, 2008; Hull, Nelken, & White, 2004) The volatility in equity 
is derived from the standard deviation between the percentage changes in daily closing prices 
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for a year multiplied by the radical of trading days. To maintain consistency the assumption of 
260 trading days across the entire sample is used.  
3.3.5 Simplifications 
There is no market data available for the variables asset value and asset volatility and 
therefore they need to be estimated through the face value of debt, market capitalization, and 
equity volatility. The relations in the equation system of the Merton model can be solved 
through a generalized reduced gradient method in order to get an estimate for asset value and 
asset volatility. Special software tools like Excel Solver are necessary in order to solve these 
equations for the two unknown. Considering the fairly large data set, this is a very time 
consuming process. Therefore the following simplifications are introduced: (1) asset value 
equals market capitalisations plus face value of debt and (2) asset volatility equals market 
capitalisation divided by asset value multiplied by equity volatility. Equity volatility is 
computed as the standard deviation of daily stock prices, multiplied by the square root of 
trading days. The understatement problem of the probability of default through the usage of 
the face value of debt was already discussed but will not affect the probabilities in the sample 
due to their small size (Du & Suo, 2007).  
The table below shows a comparison of the calculations of distance to default (DD) and 
probability of default (PD) with the simplifications assumed above and through an iterative 
process with Excel Solver. As can be seen, the differences are insignificantly small and the 
assumed simplifications therefore do not affect the outcome of our research. For the first 
iteration asset value and volatility are used, obtained through the simplifications as a first 
estimate. The equation system of the four Black & Scholes formulas for d1, d2, equity 
volatility, and equity value is then solved with the objective to minimize data deviations: 
  
         
            
 
  
          
             
 
 
 
 
( 4 ) 
The variables here represent the actual formulas set in Excel to calculate equity value and 
volatility whereas the estimate values are just the hardcoded simplifications. With the four 
formulas and initial estimates Excel can solve for the two unknown variables asset value and 
volatility for the above stated relationship (Löeffler & Posch, 2011). 
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Table 3. Excel solver method vs. applied simplification 
 
Country Company Method Year Distance to default  Default probability 
UK SSE* Solver 2007 33.6990 2.9845E-249 
UK SSE Simplification 2007 33.7012 2.7728E-249 
UK SSE Solver 2008 15.0860 1.00039E-51 
UK SSE Simplification 2008 15.0877 9.75449E-52 
UK SSE Solver 2009 22.5931 2.5315E-113 
UK SSE Simplification 2009 22.5937 2.5012E-113 
UK SSE Solver 2010 31.3110 1.6538E-215 
UK SSE Simplification 2010 31.3117 1.6149E-215 
UK SSE Solver 2011 30.3153 3.6048E-202 
UK SSE Simplification 2011 30.3157 3.5571E-202 
            
*SSE = Scottish and Southern Energy plc 
 
Due to the fact that short-term bond yields were not available for Argentina for the chosen 
timeframe an annualised lending rate from the World Bank database is used as a substitute for 
the risk free rate (World Bank Group, 2014). In addition, short-term bond yield for the 
Netherlands and Sweden were only available for bonds with a two-year maturity. Due to the 
financial stability of these economies the differences between one and two year bond yields in 
these countries will not affect our results severely as interest rates within the EU are 
converging towards zero after the financial crisis of 2007.  
3.4 Transformation of Moody’s and S&P’s ratings 
In order to run a regression and compare the distance to default with Moody’s and S&P’s 
ratings, it is required to assign numbers to the ratings, since letter ratings cannot be easily 
analysed. Starting off with the first rating Aaa (Moody’s) or AAA (S&P), to which the 
number 20 is assigned, towards the lowest rating C (Moody’s) or D (S&P) corresponding to 
the value zero. Hence, the better the rating and the higher the credit quality the higher the 
number we assigned to the rating. Nevertheless the numerical scale is imperfect since rating 
levels do not necessarily progress linearly. However, Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) 
suggest that logistic or exponential rating transformations only provide little advantages over 
the linear approach. Therefore, the linear approach will be applied which then is accounted for 
through the introduction of a quadratic term in the regression analysis.  
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Table 4. Numerical ranks assigned to Moody's and S&P's rating scale 
Investment Grad 
Moody's S&P Rank 
Aaa AAA 20 
Aa1 AA+ 19 
Aa2 AA 18 
Aa3 AA- 17 
A1 A+ 16 
A2 A 15 
A3 A- 14 
Baa1 BBB+ 13 
Baa2 BBB 12 
Baa3 BBB- 11 
 
Non-investment Grade 
Moody's S&P Rank 
Ba1 BB+ 10 
Ba2 BB 9 
Ba3 BB- 8 
B1 B+ 7 
B2 B 6 
B3 B- 5 
Caa1 CCC+ 4 
Caa2 CCC 3 
Caa3 CCC- 2 
Ca 
CC 1 
C 1 
C D 0 
 
3.5 Institutional variables 
Two institutional variables from the Worldwide Governance Indicators  for regulatory quality 
and control of corruption are introduced into the regression to test their significance with 
regard to corporate credit ratings (D. K. Kaufmann, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2013). These 
indicators consist of the six dimensions voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. Due to the overlap between these dimensions two exemplary 
dimensions are chosen and control of corruption is later dropped because of high correlation. 
The indicators are based on an aggregate of 31 data sources comprised of survey responses 
and expert assessments. For each year and country where data is available the index gives an 
estimate of governance, standard error, number of sources, the percentage rank among all 
countries, lower, and upper bounds. The estimate ranges from -2,5 weak performance to 2,5 
strong performance whereas lower and upper bound are the 90% confidence levels for the 
percentage rank (D. Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). The percentile rank is chosen as 
input for the regression in order to establish a context for a country’s scoring. 
3.6 Regression analysis 
In order to analyse the regression between the outcomes of the Merton model (distance to 
default) and the ratings derived from Moody’s and S&P a panel data set is created. A panel 
data set is a combination of cross-section and time-series data sets. Whereas time-series data 
is limited to one observation per time period, cross-section data is composed of one 
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observation per cross-section which can be things and people for example. A panel data set 
combines the two data sets into one regression. The general formula for such a regression is: 
 
 
 
                 ( 5 ) 
The investigation should provide statistical evidence of the Merton model’s DD predicting 
ability in both markets, due to the time series analysed and the nature of the investigation; it is 
a past-looking regression. A linear interaction model regression is chosen, it has been well 
established that the intuition behind the conditional hypothesis is captured quite well by 
multiplicative interaction models (Aiken & West, 1991; Friedrich, 1982; Wright Jr, 1976). 
This means that a conditional hypothesis is an increase in X associated with an increase in Y 
when condition Z is met. In the given case this means that the emerging markets are the 
interaction term, therefore if the given country is an emerging country, condition Z is met.  
3.7 Dummy variable 
Dummy variables can be introduced into the regression in order to account for qualitative 
measures the regression would not be able to capture otherwise. They usually are assigned the 
values zero and one, as in this case, and they can be used for cross-sectional and time-series 
regression. For the panel data regression on credit ratings and distance to default the variable 
stated below is introduced in order to account for the country specific attributes emerging (0) 
and developed (1) country(C. Brooks, 2008).  
Table 5. Dummy variables applied in the regression 
Dummy variable Explanation  
dv_emerging_country 0 = emerging country 
1 = developed country 
3.8 Regression 
The statistical analysis of the data is done through a cross-sectional regression with the 
software tool EViews 8. The data is therefore summarised in one Excel sheet containing 
information about the country, years, company, DD, governance indicators, the credit rating 
and its translation into numeric values. In order to include company information a company 
identifier variable is introduced, which assigns each company its own number. The mentioned 
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dummy variable dv_emerging_country distinguishes the different countries between 
developed and emerging country whereas the governance indices “control of corruption” and 
“regulatory quality” include country specific information. As aforementioned, the governance 
indicator chosen is the annual percentage ranking based on an estimate, the standard error, 
and number of data sources. Countries are ranked through an annual percentage ranking, 100 
is the best achievable ranking, whereas zero is the worst. The index used is “The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 2013”, based on an aggregate of governance indicators between 1996 
and 2012 (D. K. Kaufmann, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2013).  
The credit ratings per year are translated in accordance with the table discussed earlier in the 
methodology. The data then is imported into EViews as dated panel data. In order to examine 
the relation between credit rating as the independent variable and the dependent variables DD, 
control of corruption, regulatory quality, and country classification the following simplified 
equation is used for the analysis 
 
                                                  
                            
 
( 6 ) 
The dependent variable and the rating assigned by Moody’s and S&P’s is assumed to be 
influenced by the distance to default that is derived from the Merton model and the regulatory 
quality of that country in the specific year. 
This regression would however not account for the fact that a linear numerical scale is 
assigned to Moody’s and S&P’s ratings, whereas their ratings are clearly not following 
linearity. The problem incurred can be solved by introducing a quadratic term which is 
discussed later in chapter 3.8.3. The second problem is that it would require running two 
separate regressions in order to get results for both, emerging and mature markets. Therefore 
an interaction term is being used, by utilising the above discussed dummy variable. This leads 
us to the following formula: 
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( 7 ) 
Interaction terms have, due to their, only an observable influence on the regression when a 
certain condition is fulfilled. In practice this looks like: 
 H1: An increase in X is associated with an increase in Y when condition Z is met.  
For this specific case it means, that an increase of distance to default / regulatory quality / 
control of corruption in mature markets is associated with an increase in the rating, if the 
value of the dummy variable is 1 (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). 
They further allow for running both markets in one regression and thus simplify interpretation 
of the results. The interpretation of the results will however be slightly different than in a 
“normal” regression. The interaction terms are: 
 
                                              ( 8 ) 
 
This gives the opportunity to make a differentiated interpretation of the influences of the 
Merton model DD and the regulatory quality in emerging and mature markets. Since the 
dummy variable is 0 for emerging and 1 for mature markets, the interaction terms measure the 
influences on mature markets. In the output of the regression, the results for emerging markets 
can be simply found under Merton DD and regulatory quality. The results for mature markets 
are the accumulation of the independent variable and the interaction term of that variable, e.g. 
Merton DD and Merton DD x DV. 
EViews “Estimate equation – tool” is used in order to run the regression. Since the given data 
set is a panel data set, adjustments had to be made. Further tests of the independent variables 
also resulted in adjustments to the equation. All adjustments included, three different 
regressions are run. The first includes mature and emerging markets by including the above 
discussed interaction term. The two last regressions only include one of the analysed markets. 
This results in different outcomes, one from both for emerging and mature markets, one from 
emerging markets and one from mature markets.  
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3.8.1 Adjustments to the regression analysis 
Due to the nature of panel data adjustments are necessary. First of all, it has to be tested 
whether fixed effects in the cross section and in the period can be applied. By applying fixed 
effects, dummy variables are added to each variable in the regression. This enables the model 
to filter e.g. time specific variations in the data. A significance test of the dummy variables 
gives insights into whether fixed effects can be applied or not. The results of the tests can be 
seen in Table 6. 
Table 6. Results for significance test applied for fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 88.2968 (79.321) 0,0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1283.8415 79 0,0000 
Period F 10.3071 (5.321) 0,0000 
Period Chi-square 61.1943 5 0,0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 85.4235 (84.321) 0,0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-
square 
   
 
 
Cross-sectional fixed effects and period fixed-effects show both highly significant results and 
can therefore be applied. Another adjustment that has to be made due to panel data is the 
covariance method which is changed from ordinary to white (diagonal). Also for this a 
verification test has to be made. For the applied standard diagnostic test, the used software 
EViews does not contain any standardised function; therefore it has to be made manually. The 
results can be seen in Table 7.  
Table 7. Results of standard diagnostic test 
Cross-section-fixed (dummy variables) 
Period-fixed (dummy variables 
     
R-squared 0.4089 Mean dependent 
variable 
0.2391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2450 S.D. dependent variable 0.5713 
S.E. of regression 0.4964 Akalke info criterion 1.6279 
Sum squared resid 79.0962 Schwarz criterion 2.5079 
Log likelihood -244.5345 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.9760 
F-statistic 2.4951 Durbin-Watson stat 2.2302 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
  
 
Since the relevant value of the F-statistic is ~2,5, the test is significant, which signals that this 
research setting can be applied. 
42 
3.8.2 Adjustments to the equation 
Before the regression can be interpreted, tests have to be run that prove its significance. 
Consequently a correlation test between the independent variables was done which results in a 
high correlation between control of corruption and regulatory quality, as presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Correlation analysis of independent variables 
  
DISTANCE_TO_DE
FAULT 
REGULATORY_QU
ALITY 
CONTROL_OF_CORR
UPTION 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFA
ULT 1 0.1815 0.0994 
REGULATORY_QUAL
ITY 0.1815 1 0.9597 
CONTROL_OF_CORR
UPTION 0.0994 0.9598 1 
 
 
Due to the high correlation between control of corruption and regulatory quality, one of the 
two independent variables needs to be excluded from the regression. Running the correlation 
test for the regression, the results show a higher significance for regulatory quality. Therefore, 
control of corruption will be excluded from the equation leading to the final equation: 
                                                  
                                                 
 
( 9 ) 
 
3.8.3 Quadratic term 
The linear translation of the alphabetic rating bears problems that have to be accounted for in 
the regression. A graphical explanation can be seen in Figure 4 and 5. Whereas the distance to 
default is distributed in a non-linear way the numerical transformation of the ratings is done 
linearly. This problem can be solved through the introduction of a quadratic term which is the 
DD squared, hence quadratic term. The quadratic term basically helps to create the 
exponential slope seen in Figure 5 for the regression instead of the linear transformation 
exhibited in Figure 6.  
                                       
 
                                            
                             
 
( 10 ) 
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Figure 5. Graphical visulisation of the distance to default based on the data from the sample collected 
within this study 
 
 
Figure 6. Visualisation of the numerical translation discussed in chapter 3.4 
 
3.8.4 Robustness of the regression 
In order to ensure robustness of the regression two sub-regressions are run. The sub-
regression only contain one of the markets (emerging or mature), meaning that two 
regressions are required to being run in order to capture both markets. The results should be 
similar to the ones deriving from the interaction-term regression that runs the data from both 
markets at once. The sample is the same as for the interaction-term regression, hence both 
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sub-samples should together contain an equal number of observations as the interaction-term 
regression does.  
3.9 Visualisation of methodology 
Figure 7 is a three-step visualisation of the applied methodology, in the first step, the data is 
collected for the period of 2007-2012, the second step shows the data analysis and the 
different types of data used. In step three, the data analysed previously is run in a regression, 
the result of the regression indicates whether it is significant or not and whether the sample 
data supports or rejects the hypotheses. 
  
Figure 7. Visualisation of methodology 
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4 Data Analysis 
The following chapter contains the panel data analysis of the sample starting with 
descriptive statistics, explaining the sample characteristics and the actual analysis. This is 
followed by the analysis of the fixed effects regression model. Furthermore, a robustness test 
will be provided. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The analysed, unbalanced panel data sample consists of 411 observations in total, including 
six periods and 80 cross sections. The original planned number of observation was 500, with 
company data of 100 firms being analysed over a six year time horizon, but several years for 
which no credit rating was available were dropped.  
The Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression analysis, which tests for auto correlation of the 
residual series, is 1,259464. In this case this would mean that the residuals are positively auto 
correlated since the value would be below the critical value threshold    of 1,42 (C. Brooks, 
2008). This is however disregarded as the Durbin-Watson statistic for panelled data with fixed 
effects, for cross sections and periods, is rather inconclusive and very difficult to interpret. 
Similar circumstances apply to R-squared and the adjusted R-squared through the fixed 
effects assigning dummy variables to every variable in the regression, leading to very high R-
squared values.   
Table 9 shows an analysis of the data collected for the purpose of this thesis; it breaks down 
the base sample into a set of sub samples according to: type of country, type of rating, average 
country/company rating and industry diversification. By doing so, it provides the reader with 
a deeper understanding of the data and its structure for the regression analysis, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics 
 
Starting with the first row, type of county, the fact that the amount of observations in mature 
markets is significantly higher than in emerging markets stands out. As already mentioned 
before, initially the same amount of data was collected for both markets. However, a 
significant amount of ratings in emerging markets was withdrawn and could therefore not be 
included in the sample. Looking at the average ratings, they are 10 in emerging markets (Ba1 
Moody’s, BB+ S&P) and reflect a non-investment grade rating, whereas the average rating in 
mature countries is 13 (Baa1 Moody’s, BBB+ S&P) and reflect an investment-grade rating. 
The Merton model seems in general to support the rating agencies, since the distance to 
default in emerging countries is lower than in mature countries. A significant gap between 
emerging and mature markets can be seen in the average regulatory quality, which is twice as 
high for mature markets. 
The next row, type of rating, provides insights into the distribution of investment-grade and 
non-investment grade ratings among emerging and mature countries. Although the results 
from row one could lead to the conclusion that mature markets could contain a higher amount 
Type of country
No. of 
observations
Avg agency 
rating
 Avg distance to 
default
Avg regulatory 
quality
Emerging 125 10.34 7.59 43.44
Mature 286 13.27 10.26 93.38
Type of rating
Investment-grade in emerging markets 54 12.85 9.18 49.48
Non-investment-grade in emerging markets 71 8.42 6.38 38.85
Investment-grade in mature markets 242 14.00 10.59 93.29
Non-investment-grade in mature markets 44 9.30 8.44 93.89
Average Country / Company ratings
France, average country rating: 19,83* 70 13.53 6.67 85.53
Germany, average country rating: 20 56 13.36 6.24 93.34
Netherlands, average country rating: 20 54 13.44 7.98 97.33
Sweden, average country rating: 20 53 12.51 8.22 96.87
United Kingdom, average country rating: 20 53 13.43 23.62 96.28
Argentina, average country rating: 5 27 7.41 5.76 23.04
Brazil, average country rating: 11 33 10.18 5.59 54.94
India, average country rating: 9,83 31 11.26 8.49 39.97
Indonesia, average country rating: 9,17 16 10.00 12.53 41.13
Mexico, average country rating: 13 18 13.72 8.05 61.00
Industry diversification
Car manufacturer 34 11.82 4.48 82.21
Consumer products 12 15.00 13.64 91.50
Energy 43 11.88 8.90 64.58
Industrial goods 92 12.30 7.31 86.82
Industrial services 22 12.00 10.56 76.68
Oil & gas 45 12.87 11.42 54.49
Pharmaceuticals & Medical research 20 13.45 14.70 88.15
Retailer 6 14.00 5.84 85.67
Services 30 11.97 6.92 94.93
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of investment grade rated companies, it is still surprising that in emerging markets only 40% 
of the companies are rated investment grade, whereas 85% of the companies are rated 
investment grade in mature markets. This can be traced back to the fact that rating agencies 
still employ the rule of a sovereign rating ceiling in many cases. The assigned ratings by the 
agencies are also on average higher in emerging than in mature countries, both in investment-
grade and in non-investment grade. Again, from looking at the raw numbers, it seems that the 
Merton model supports the ratings of the rating agencies, since it arrives on average at a 
higher distance to default for mature market firms than for emerging market firms.  
Row three provides an overview over the distribution of the observations among the 
countries, the average ratings of these countries, the average ratings assigned to the companies 
by Moody’s and S&P and the average results derived from the Merton model. Congruent with 
the results from row one, row three also shows a higher amount of observations from mature 
than from emerging markets. Excluding Mexico, emerging market countries companies have 
in general a lower rating than mature country companies. A relationship between high ratings 
and high distance to default can be observed, however it does not seem to be as strong as in 
the previous examples. It is difficult to say whether lower country ratings also lead to lower 
company ratings, since the origin of these ratings cannot be concluded from the given data. 
Still, most of the company ratings are not higher than the ratings of their “home country”. 
However, what can be concluded is that all five mature countries have very high values for 
regulatory quality, in contrast to the emerging countries. Argentina has the lowest regulatory 
quality and yields also the lowest average ratings, while Mexico has the highest regulatory 
quality and accordingly yielded the highest average ratings. 
Row four shows the distribution of the companies among nine different industries, the 
randomly selected companies show a good distribution. Concerning the assigned ratings and 
the distance-to-default, it seems rather difficult to draw any scientific conclusion. 
The mean of the numerically translated credit ratings is 12,38 with a standard deviation of 
2,85. This corresponds to a rating of approximately Baa2 with a range from A2 to Ba1/Ba2 
and the minimum and maximum values were five and 19 with B3 and Aa1 ratings 
respectively. The median of credit ratings corresponds to a Baa1 rating.  
For distance to default the median for the sample was 6,67 with a mean value of 9,45. The 
standard deviation for this value is fairly high with 8,30, giving a range of 17,75 to 1,15. 
Furthermore, it is peculiar that the minimum value for distance to default is negative with       
-0,04. This can be explained by findings of Crosbie & Bohn (2003) who find that companies 
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can still be in business even though asset values have fallen below debt values. Hence, these 
companies are only regarded to being in default when asset values are far below the debt 
values.   
The sample mean for regulatory quality is fairly high as well with 78,19 due to the 
concentration of high scorings in mature countries and Brazil for example. Similar is observed 
for the median and the standard deviation although the minimum value of the sample is 19. 
This further points at a concentration of country scorings around the mean value.  
Table 10. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Rating 12.38 13 2.85 5 19 
DD 9.45 6.67 8.3 -0.04 43.39 
Regulatory 
Quality 
78.19 92 24.51 19 100 
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
Table 11. EViews 8 output of regression analysis 
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. 
C 8.8919 1.5277 5.8205 0.0000 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT 0.0999 0.0267 3.7390 0.0002 
SQUR -0.0013 0.0004 -3.1817 0.0016 
DV*DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT -0.0199 0.0179 -1.1148 0.2658 
REGULATORY_QUALITY 0.0669 0.0266 2.5149 0.0124 
DV*REGULATORY_QUALITY -0.0362 0.0349 -1.0349 0.3015 
     
     
R-squared 0.9711 Mean dependent 
variable 
12.380 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9631 S.D. dependent variable 2.8451 
S.E. of regression 0.5468 Akalke info criterion 1.8214 
Sum squared resid 95.9824 Schwarz criterion 2.7014 
Log likelihood -284.2987 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.1695 
F-statistic 121.1038 Durbin-Watson stat 1.2595 
 
 
When interpreting the above results of the regression, the first coefficient of 0,099872 for DD 
in emerging markets means that if DD increases by one standard deviation the credit rating 
increases by 0,099872 notches. The fact that the coefficient has a positive value is logical 
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since a greater distance to default leads to a better credit rating where an AAA rating has the 
highest possible value of 20.  
SQUR, as already discussed, was introduced into the regression in order to account for non-
linearity of credit ratings. The problem at hand can be observed with Figure 5 and 6 of the 
previous section. Therefore, the quadratic term was introduced to achieve the non-linear slope 
of Figure 5 for DD. The coefficient is negative in this case which is a logical consequence 
since the slope for DD is decreasing due to the fact that there is a rating ceiling of AAA or 20 
in numerical values and the reduced impact of DD on the rating. 
The coefficient for regulatory quality in emerging markets is interpreted that a one unit 
increase in regulatory quality leads to an increase of about 0,067 notches in the credit rating.  
The dummy variable DV multiplied by DD gives the magnitude of the impact of DD for 
credit ratings in mature countries. Because of the negative value of the coefficient it has to be 
deducted from the original coefficient of DD in order to arrive at the DD coefficient for 
developed countries. The value of the coefficient being negative also means in this case that 
DD has a reduced impact on credit ratings in mature markets compared to emerging market 
countries. However, the probability of this variable is insignificant meaning that DD there is 
no significant difference between the effects of DD in developed and emerging countries.  
Essentially, the same can be observed for regulatory quality in developed countries. The value 
for regulatory quality in developed countries needs to be deducted from the coefficient of 
regulatory quality in emerging markets, as regulatory quality has a reduced impact on 
developed markets. But the probability is insignificant as well which is interpreted as 
regulatory quality having no significantly different effects on credit ratings in developed 
countries compared to emerging markets.  
4.2.1 Impact of distance-to-default 
The variable DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT has a positive coefficient and is statistically 
significant. The regression supports the hypothesis that stock markets of emerging countries 
are efficient and DD therefore have a high explanatory power, at a 99% confidence level, 
representing the variable with the highest statistical significance. The results indicate that an 
increase of the DD derived from the Merton model will lead to an increase of the rating 
assigned to the company. The descriptive analysis strengthens the result, since it shows a 
well-distributed sample among the emerging countries analysed. The sample data analysis in 
chapter 3.1 further shows a good average distribution of the emerging country companies 
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among the industries. However, it shows a certain concentration for energy and oil & gas 
companies which is not surprising for emerging market countries. As far as it is possible to 
draw a conclusion based on the descriptive analysis, it does not seem that there are industry 
specific biases for energy and oil & gas companies in the ratings they got assigned and the 
distance-to-default derived from the Merton model. 
Hypothesis 1: Distance to default has a significant influence on credit ratings in emerging 
markets. 
Result: Hypothesis is supported by the sample at a 99% confidence level. 
 
For the variable DV*DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT the regression yields a negative 
coefficient. Since it is an interaction term, it has to be interpreted as the sum of the variable 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT, which in turn results in a positive accumulated coefficient. 
Nevertheless the coefficient DV*DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT is not significant. This 
indicates that DD has the same effect on ratings in mature and emerging markets.  Therefore, 
emerging and mature markets exhibit similar information content in stock market data 
measured through experiencing the same impact of DD. Although the descriptive analysis 
indicates a good distribution of the companies among mature markets and also among the 
industries, a potential bias could still be that only European companies are included within the 
study. For the reason of their differences in investor protection and corporate governance 
systems, compared to central European countries it would be interesting to run the regression 
on a sample of US companies. Still, as shown in the descriptive analysis around 19% of the 
mature market companies are from the UK, since the UK as part of the Anglo-Saxon region 
has a similar financial market framework to the US it is questionable, if including US 
companies would have led to another result.  
Hypothesis 4: Distance to default has a greater impact on credit ratings in mature than in 
emerging markets. 
Result: Not significant 
4.2.2 Influence of regulatory quality and control of corruption 
The positive coefficient REGULATORY_QUALITY confirms our expectation that the 
ratings are influenced by certain risk measuring indices. Being significant at a 99% level the 
sample supports the hypothesis, that regulatory quality has a significant influence on credit 
ratings in emerging markets. According to the regression an increase in regulatory quality 
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would result in an increase of the rating, which seems fairly reasonable. The  descriptive 
statistics further supports this since it reports on average values twice as high for regulatory 
quality in mature compared to emerging countries which is in line with the lower ratings 
assigned to companies from emerging country. 
Hypothesis 2: Regulatory quality and control of corruption have a significant influence on 
credit ratings in emerging markets 
Result: Hypothesis is supported by the sample at a 99% confidence level. 
 
Contrary to the expectations regulatory quality does not have a greater impact on ratings for 
mature market companies. It only has a small impact as it can be seen in the sum of the 
variables REGULATORY QUALITY and DV*REGULATORY QUALITY; however, this is 
not significant. Therefore, the coefficient for mature markets can be disregarded as there is no 
significant difference between the impact if regulatory quality in emerging and developed 
countries. The descriptive statistics does not support the result of the regression, since it 
shows very high regulatory quality in all mature countries and fairly low in all emerging. It 
would therefore be reasonable to assume that the lower regulatory quality has a greater impact 
whereas the high regulatory quality is seen as a standard in mature markets. However, based 
on the given regression and sample data, regulatory quality is considered equally important by 
rating agencies in both markets. 
Hypothesis 3: Regulatory quality and control of corruption have a greater impact on credit 
ratings in emerging markets. 
Result: Not significant 
 
The essence of these findings is that regulatory quality and DD have a significant impact on 
credit ratings for emerging market firms whereas they do not differ significantly for 
developed countries, which is controversial to what was initially assumed. Hence, the sample 
data could not give any evidence that the Merton model has a greater impact on ratings in 
mature compared to emerging markets. Because of the insignificance of the findings for DD 
and regulatory quality the coefficients can be disregarded. Therefore, the DD derived from the 
Merton model has the same implication for the efficiency of developed and emerging 
markets. One explanation for that can be that emerging markets only seem more efficient than 
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mature markets since there is less information available in these markets; hence they seem to 
be better at incorporating information although they are not. 
4.3 Robustness of the regression 
In order to test for robustness of the regression and verify the above stated results, the same 
regression is being run on sub samples (emerging and mature markets) the regression is 
assumed to be robust when the results of the sub samples in general support the interaction-
model regression that works with both markets at once. The results of the sub-regressions can 
be seen in tables 12 and 13. It will be further examined if the high r-square is a consequence 
of the applied fixed-effects. Moreover tests will be run in order examine if the data shows 
evidence of non-normality and heteroskedasticity.  
Table 12. Regression output of emerging market data sample 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.7533 1.5031 4500840 0.0000 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT 0.1601 0.0629 2.5439 0.0127 
PDSQ -0.0027 0.0014 -1.9846 0.0503 
CONTROL_OF_CORRUPPTION 0.0108 0.0250 0.4336 0.6656 
REGULATORY_QUALITY 0.0493 0.0289 1.7042 0.0919 
     
     
R-squared 0.9580 Mean dependent variable 10.336 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9402 S.D. dependent variable 2.7237 
S.E. of regression 0.6667 Akalke info criterion 2.2710 
Sum squared resid 38.608 Schwarz criterion 3.1308 
Log likelihood -103.94 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.6203 
F-statistic 53.672 Durbin-Watson stat 1.3598 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
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Table 13. Regression output of mature market data sample 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.2996 4.6794 1.3462 0.1796 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT 0.0577 0.0256 2.2513 0.0253 
PDSQ -0.0009 0.0005 -1.8829 0.0610 
CONTROL_OF_CORRUPPTION 0.0370 0.0494 0.7486 0.4549 
REGULATORY_QUALITY 0.0329 0.0220 1.4965 0.1359 
     
     
R-squared 0.9660 Mean dependent variable 13.273 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9571 S.D. dependent variable 2.4052 
S.E. of regression 0.4984 Akalke info criterion 1.6292 
Sum squared resid 56.1363 Schwarz criterion 2.3962 
Log likelihood -172.9825 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.9367 
F-statistic 108.6718 Durbin-Watson stat 1.2391 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
 
Both sub-regressions support the interaction-term regression. Whereas in mature markets 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT and REGULATORY_QUALITY are positive and significant, 
both variables yield insignificant results for mature markets, which is in line with the results 
of the interaction-term regression. 
Sub-samples and interaction-term regression report very high results for R-squared. Since the 
applied fixed effects add dummy variables, they could be the potential source of explanation. 
This is especially the case when the ratings stay constant over time and do not change. In the 
given scenario the dummy variable would adjust to upcoming differences between distance-t-
to default, regulatory quality and the rating and hence increase the R-squared. In order to 
address this potential source of bias, the rating changes over the studied period are analysed. 
Therefore an average rating of the numerical translated company rating is calculated for each 
company and year. Afterwards, the average rating is retransformed into a rating according to 
Moody’s rating scale, which is presented in chapter 3.4. The results are presented in table 14. 
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Table 14. Average company rating per country and year 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Argentina Ba2 Ba3 B1 B1 B1 B2 
Brazil Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 
Mexico A3 A3 Baa1 A3 A3 A3 
India Baa2 Baa2 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 
Indonesia Ba1 Ba1 Ba2 Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 
France  A2 A3 A3 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 
Germany A3 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 
UK A3 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 
Netherlands A3 A3 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 
Sweden Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 
 
 
 
The original calculated average numerical ratings can be found in appendix 7.1. Concluding 
the results of the table, the company ratings stay on average fairly constant, this is more often 
the case in mature than emerging  countries. Therefore the high r-squared is a result of the 
applied fixed effects. A test run of a regression without fixed effects resulted in a r-square of 
0,37, which seems more realistic then the given result. 
To ensure that the regression accounts for heteroskedasticity, the regression model white-
diagonal-sections was run. The results of the corresponding white test for heteroskedasticity 
can be taken from table 15. The dependent variable has been changed to RESIDSQ. The 
resulting F-statistic of ~2,5 signals that the regression passed the test. 
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Table 15. Heteroskedasticity test 
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.2996 4.6794 1.3462 0.1796 
DISTANCE_TO_DEFAULT 0.0577 0.0256 2.2513 0.0253 
PDSQ -0.0009 0.0005 -1.8829 0.0610 
CONTROL_OF_CORRUPPTION 0.0370 0.0494 0.7486 0.4549 
REGULATORY_QUALITY 0.0329 0.0220 1.4965 0.1359 
     
     
R-squared 0.9660 Mean dependent 
variable 
13.273 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9571 S.D. dependent variable 2.4052 
S.E. of regression 0.4984 Akalke info criterion 1.6292 
Sum squared resid 56.136 Schwarz criterion 2.3962 
Log likelihood -172.98 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.9367 
F-statistic 108.67 Durbin-Watson stat 1.2391 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
 
 
Table 16 below shows, non-normality is not an issue in our regression - the sample data is 
well-distributed. Moreover, the Jarqua-Beta and the corresponding probability suggest a very 
high significance. 
Table 16. Non-normality test 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2007 2012
Observations 411
Mean       3.00e-17
Median   0.000000
Maximum  2.059981
Minimum -2.649724
Std. Dev.   0.483842
Skewness  -0.157186
Kurtosis   6.748508
Jarque-Bera  242.3211
Probability  0.000000
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5 Conclusion and discussion 
This chapter will conclude the main findings of our study. Furthermore, an outlook for future 
research will be proposed that could provide a deeper understanding of the findings. 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The hypotheses that were established for the emerging markets are supported by the sample 
data, whereas the results for the hypotheses related to mature markets were insignificant. This 
leads to the conclusion that the DD from the Merton model works equally accurate with 
market data from emerging markets and developed markets. A possible explanation could be 
that the DD is equally considered by rating agencies when determining corporate credit 
ratings.  
The overall goal was to determine whether the Merton model has a greater impact on ratings 
in developed markets than in emerging markets, which was not supported by the sample data 
due to an insignificant difference between credit ratings and DD derived from the Merton 
model. Findings show that the Merton model yields significant results in emerging markets 
and considers country specific information, yet only through stock prices and volatility. 
Concluding this means that country specific circumstances of emerging markets are included 
in Market data, hence the Merton model accounts for the specific circumstances to emerging 
markets. The results show that DD and the institutional factor regulatory quality have a 
similar impact on ratings in both markets. However, the model does not account for quality 
and availability of information in these countries, which in turn have a negative impact on 
market efficiency. But no examination was made with regard to the quality of information or 
publishing frequency. As Griffin et al. (2010) pointed out emerging markets can appear to be 
equally or even more efficient because mature markets have more information available 
which is released more frequently in comparison to emerging markets. This biases findings 
towards determining similar efficiencies in emerging and mature markets. Therefore, it is 
increasingly difficult for the market to react in time and factor new information into stock 
prices for example. This is in line with (Du & Suo 2007) who find that “…credit quality 
information contained in the equity value of a firm is not fully utilized by structural credit risk 
models”. The distance to default does not capture qualitative circumstances with regard to 
information like publishing frequency relative to incorporation speed. This could explain why 
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emerging markets in this study appear to be equally effective in incorporating market 
information into equity data because of the mentioned differences in frequency. The Merton 
model captures market information in emerging markets to determine a firm’s 
creditworthiness but cannot account for qualitative factors of information. The Merton model 
yields equally results in emerging and mature markets,  
Because of correlation issues between the independent variables 
CONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION and REGULATORY_QUALITY the variable for 
corruption is dropped as regulatory quality yields more significant results for the regression. 
The impact of the regulatory quality on credit ratings in emerging markets is similar to the 
distance to default whereas the results are not significant for the coefficient of mature 
countries. Therefore regulatory quality has the same impact in both markets. For future 
research it would therefore be interesting to examine if governance indicators or other 
influencing factors for credit ratings actually behave similarly to the distance to default in 
emerging markets and mature markets.  
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Figure 8. Summarised hypothesises 
 
Accepted 
Not significant 
Rejected 
 
 
  
Distance to 
default  
H1: Distance to default has 
a significant influence on 
credit ratings in emerging 
markets. 
H4: Distance to default has 
a greater impact on credit 
ratings in mature than in 
emerging markets. 
Regulatory 
quality 
H2: Regulatory quality and 
control of corruption have a 
significant influence on 
credit ratings in emerging 
markets. 
H3: Regulatory quality and 
control of corruption have a 
greater impact on credit 
ratings in emerging 
markets. 
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5.2 Future research 
Most of the present literature today focuses on the adequacy of the Merton model to forecast 
default, changes in a company’s credit rating, or ways to improve it either as it is discussed in 
the literature review. For example, Bohn et al. (2005) and  Stein (2002) differ in their opinions 
about the adequacy of the inputs of the Merton model. Others arrived at different conclusions 
about the impact of the model with regard to its statistical significance for default. Little 
attention is actually paid to the quality and availability of information within the analysed 
countries, used to calculate the outputs of the model. It would therefore be interesting to 
examine the impact of different qualities of information on the outcome of the Merton model 
for very similar firms. In this regard, market efficiency in the present literature is mostly 
examined through effectiveness of different trading strategies and for example based on 
returns and transaction costs. As the results of this study show similar results for emerging 
and developed countries, future researchers could try and determine an adequate qualitative 
statistic for information publishing frequency and incorporation speed of companies that is 
tested for significance in this setting.  
Due to the fact that there exist many other credit risk models like the KMV model, or models 
using actuarial approaches like Credit Metrics by JP Morgan or CreditRisk+ by Credit Suisse, 
it would be interesting to match the results of this paper against those retrieved from a study 
using one of these models in a similar setting.   
Furthermore, due to the limitation of this study, different country specific variables like 
REGULATORY_QUALITY could be added to the regression model in order to determine 
more relevant explanatory variables for credit ratings. This would especially be interesting for 
developed markets as findings showed no significant differences for this variable in the two 
markets when explaining credit ratings by S&P and Moody’s. It is also suspected that these 
country specific variables behave similarly to the distance to default shown in Figure 5. 
Examining the validity of this assumption for regulatory quality as well as other possibly 
newly introduced variables would be an interesting start for future research in this regard. 
Moreover, the duration of the analysed period could be increased to circumvent the bias of the 
financial crisis of 2007, which is present in all the gathered data. An increase would then also 
include more past crises, their prelude, peak, aftermath, and normalization periods. As for the 
period of 2007 until 2012, there was no or little data available as we are just now navigating 
towards the aftermath and normalization period of the 2007 crisis.  
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Numerical translation of average company ratings per year 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Argentinia 9 8 7 7 7 6 
Brazil 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Mexico 14 14 13 14 14 14 
India 12 12 11 11 11 11 
Indonesia 10 10 9 10 10 10 
France  15 14 14 13 13 13 
Germany 14 13 13 13 13 13 
UK 14 13 13 13 13 13 
Netherlands 14 14 13 13 13 13 
Sweden 13 13 13 12 12 12 
 
7.2 Emerging markets 
Emerging Countries 
Country Company Industry       
Argentina Aluar Industrial Goods       
Argentina Celulosa Industrial Goods       
Argentina Pampa Energia Energy       
Argentina Petrobras Oil & Gas       
Argentina Telecom Argentinia Software & IT Services       
Argentina Transportadora de Gas del Sur Oil & Gas       
Argentina YPF Oil & Gas       
Brazil Brasksem Industrial Goods       
Brazil BRF Consumer Goods       
Brazil CCR Industrial Services       
Brazil CESP Energy       
Brazil Companhia Energetica de Minas Energy       
Brazil CPFL Energia Energy       
Brazil Diagnosticos da America Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research       
Brazil Eletropaulo Energy       
Brazil Light SA Technology Equipment       
Brazil Vale Mineral Resources       
India 
  
      
Indonesia Astra International Industrial Conglomerate       
Indonesia BT Bumi Energy       
Indonesia Indosat Software & IT Services       
Indonesia Perusahaan Gas Oil & Gas       
Indonesia Telekomunikasi Software & IT Services       
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Mexico Alfa Industrial Conglomerate       
Mexico America Movil Software & IT Services       
Mexico Cemex Industrial Goods       
Mexico Grupo Aeroportario del Pacifico Industrial Services       
Mexico Grupo Bimbo Consumer Goods       
Mexico TV Azteca Software & IT Services       
Mexico Telefonos de Mexico Software & IT Services       
 
7.3 Mature markets 
Mature Countries 
Country Company Industry 
France Bouygues Industrial Services 
France Carrefour Retailer 
France Saint-Gobain Industrial Goods 
France Electricite de France Energy 
France L'Oreal Consumer Products 
France Peugeot Car Manufacturer 
France Renault Car Manufacturer 
France Sanofi Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research 
France Schneider Electric Technology Equipment 
France Suez Industrial Goods 
France Total Oil & Gas 
France Vivendi Consumer Services 
France Accor Consumer Services 
France Cap Gemini Software & IT Services 
Germany Adidas Consumer Products 
Germany BASF Industrial Goods 
Germany Bayer Industrial Goods 
Germany BMW Car Manufacturer 
Germany Beiersdorf Consumer Goods 
Germany Continental Industrial Goods 
Germany Daimler Car Manufacturer 
Germany EON Energy 
Germany Lufthansa Services 
Germany Deutsche Post Services 
Germany Deutsche Telekom Services 
Germany Allianz Services 
Netherlands Fugro Industrial Services 
Netherlands Heineken Consumer Products 
Netherlands Koninklijke DSM Industrial Goods 
Netherlands KPN Services 
Netherlands Philips Technology Equipment 
Netherlands Post NL Services 
Netherlands Reed Elsevier Software & IT Services 
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Netherlands Unilever Consumer Products 
Netherlands AkzoNobel Industrial Goods 
Netherlands ASM International Industrial Services 
Netherlands Royal Dutch Shell Oil & Gas 
Netherlands Wolters Kluwer Industrial Services 
Sweden Volvo Car Manufacturer 
Sweden Atalas Copco Industrial Goods 
Sweden Electrolux Technology Equipment 
Sweden Ericsson Technology Equipment 
Sweden SKF Industrial Goods 
Sweden Assa Abloy Industrial Goods 
Sweden Holmen Industrial Goods 
Sweden Sandvik Industrial Goods 
Sweden SSAB Industrial Goods 
Sweden Swedish Match Consumer Goods 
Sweden Telia Sonera Software & IT Services 
United 
Kingdom 
BAE Systems Industrial Goods 
United 
Kingdom 
BAT Consumer Goods 
United 
Kingdom 
Centrica Oil & Gas 
United 
Kingdom 
Diageo Consumer Goods 
United 
Kingdom 
GKN Industrial Goods 
United 
Kingdom 
GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research 
United 
Kingdom 
Pearson Consumer Services 
United 
Kingdom 
Rolls Royce Industrial Goods 
United 
Kingdom 
SSE Energy 
United 
Kingdom 
Tullow Oil Oil & Gas 
 
